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The Role of Party Identification in a
Nonpartisan Election: A Case Study
in Provo, Utah
Sean Kelly and Allison Holmes

Introduction
Every November we are urged to go to the polls and vote for a wide range of
elected officials. The process in which we make our decision is largely influenced by
party identification. This is a low-cost tool voters use as they cast their ballots, but
when official party identification is removed, as it is in nonpartisan elections, how do
voters make their choice?
Nonpartisan elections originated from the hope that by removing party organizations from elections, voters would make their decisions for the best candidate and
not the party affiliation (Schaffner et aI., 2001, 9). Gerald C. Wright notes that "more
than three-fourths of municipal elections and about half of all U.S. elections use the
nonpartisan ballot" (2008, 13). With the large number of nonpartisan elections, political scientists still know little about the process voters go through in deciding who to
vote for in these types of elections. We argue that whether or not party identification is removed as a factor in a nonpartisan ballot election is largely dependent upon
campaign effects; where candidates use mailers, signs, phone calls, and door-to-door
contacts to frame and counter-frame one another in partisan terms.
The 2009 Provo City mayoral race, an area in which both the voters and the candidates heavily lean toward the Republican Party, provides an excellent setting to
analyze the effectiveness and use of campaign effects to introduce party identification in nonpartisan elections. The two mayoral candidates were Steve Clark and John
Curtis. Our hypothesis was that Clark, through campaign effects, would frame Curtis
as a democrat, making the election partisan. As a result, Clark would win the election
due to the high concentration of conservative voters. While our assumptions that
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Clark would frame Curtis as a democrat held true, Curtis counteracted Clark's efforts
with his own campaign and win the election. These results are aligned with our thesis
that in the absence of official party identification, candidates determine the impact of
political identification through their campaign strategy.

Literature Review
Nonpartisan elections were created to limit party influence in politics. Schaffner
et al. describe the progressive movement as the belief that by eliminating the influence of partisanship, elections would result in better outcomes, such as the election
of government officials who are more attentive to local needs (2001, 8). Schaffner et
al. go on to explain that the progressives' conclusions rely on an informed electorate
interested in obtaining the "common good" (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9).
This ideal of a caring, informed electorate is unrealistic. Research shows that
rather than spending hours online, reading the newspaper, or engaging in political
dialogue, voters look for low-cost cues to help them make their vote choice (Schaffner
et al. 2001,9; see also Lupia 1994; Popkins 1994). Essentially, this means even among
those who actually vote on Election Day, the majority have not invested much time
researching and seeking for the "common good." Campbell et al. in the American
Voter, explain that party identification is a significant low-cost tool that drives vote
choice on Election Day (1960).
In the absence of official party identification, voting behavior may be significantly
affected by other factors. In their study, Schaffner et al. conclude that without party
identification, voters rely on the most readily available low-cost cue-incumbency.
This augments the theory that voters do not take the time to search out the issues in
order to make informed decisions. Schaffner et al. also suggest that in nonpartisan
elections, "even a modestly effective campaign might have substantial effects where
voters have few readily available pointers on who they should support" (2001, 26).
Essentially, the theory that whoever wins the campaign contact battle will have a
greater chance of winning seems correct. This could be said of any election, but it is
more prevalent in nonpartisan elections where voters are more susceptible to campaign influence.
So far, the impact of removing party identification has been examined, and there
is research suggesting party affiliation may still be influential in nonpartisan elections. Peverill Squire and Eric R.A.N. Smith explain that voters may not need the
party officially identified on the ballot, because they "will pick up on partisan cues
in the environment" and it is possible for voters to still "use partisan information to
structure their voting decisions" (Peverill and Smith 1988, 177). This complements
the theory of Schaffner et al. that campaign effects have greater potential to influence
nonpartisan races. As a result, campaigns may turn nonpartisan elections partisan as
they frame either or both candidates as being directly affiliated with a certain party.
10
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Squire and Smith are not alone in their assumptions. Charles R. Adrian categorizes nonpartisan elections into one of four types. A type I election is when the candidate's party is easily identified and voters view the election in partisan terms (1959,
452). A type II election is where candidates are supported by a number of groups
including parties; this type of election still contains the influence of the party but
not as directly as in Type I elections due to the presence of other groups who are not
associated with either party but are still politically active in the election (1959, 453).
A type III election is characterized by the support of different interest groups for the
candidates but very little support from political parties. Lastly, a type N election
is one where political parties are not important in campaigns (1959, 457). Adrian's
article explains the party may playa role in nonpartisan elections in varying degrees
ranging from very involved in Type I nonpartisan elections to not involved at all in
Type N nonpartisan elections.
In summary, the campaign is the largest determinant of election type. David A.
Niven uses psychological research to explain how voters can be influenced. Voters
are influenced depending on "the accessibility of the message" and "[thinking] themselves personally affected by the message" (Niven 2004,871). Campaigns seek to influence vote choice; if they are successful in making their message "accessible" and
salient, they can determine the level of partisanship in an election. This will depend
on whether or not a candidate believes he or she has an advantage by attaching party
identification to the nonpartisan election.

A Case Study: Provo, Utah
The 2009 Provo City mayoral race offered an ideal opportunity to understand
how campaigns determine the effects of creating the illusion of partisanship in a nonpartisan election. Provo, Utah, is a distinctive place. The population is homogenousespecially among voters. The majority of residents are religiously active, politically
conservative, and family oriented. In fact, more than 70 percent of the population
identify themselves as republican (Appendix A, Table 1). While these demographics
make it difficult to apply our findings to other populations, it allows us to isolate and
analyze the role of partisan framing through campaign effects.
Both mayoral- candidates, Steve Clark and John Curtis, have similar characteristics that reflect the population: they are both white, middle-aged males and members
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. While neither one of them was
technically an incumbent, Steve Clark was serving as a State Representative. Therefore, we assumed any incumbent advantage would transfer to him. Previous to the
mayoral election, John Curtis had unsuccessfully run for a State House and Senate
seat. As a result of their backgrounds, both candidates had significant campaign experiences. Clark and Curtis were raised in the Provo area, have large families, and
were executives of successful local companies.
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The two main issues facing Provo voters were iProvo and zoning law issues.
When we looked at the candidates' web sites, we could not find a clear distinction
between their views on these issues. Therefore, we assumed the issues would play
little role in the outcome of the election.

Hypotheses
The literature suggests that even in a nonpartisan election, party identification
can playa significant role. Due to the Republican Party dominance in Provo, we believed that if a candidate had any history with the Democratic Party, it would be a
disadvantage to them at the polls.
While prominent members of the Republican Party endorsed both candidates,
Curtis previously had been both the vice-president and president of the Utah County
Democratic Party. As a result, we predicted Clark's campaign would frame Curtis as
a democrat to turn the election partisan. We hypothesized that Clark would win the
race with the clear republican advantage in Provo.

Data/Methodology
We collected campaign literature from both campaigns. This was necessary to
determine whether or not Clark used Curtis' political history against him. It was also
important to see how Curtis' campaign would respond to any suggestion that he was
not "republican enough" to be the Provo mayor. Because we were interested in partisan framing, the only mailers we analyzed in this study were those that identified
Curtis as a democrat and his response to those attacks.
We used data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll to evaluate the effectiveness of
both campaigns. The exit poll has been in operation since 1982 and has consistently
been the most accurate poll in Utah. On Election Day, there were pollsters at all nineteen voting locations. They selected voters at a random interval based on the projected turnout for their given location. On Election Day, 10,750 people voted, and over
2,500 participated in the exit poll. We used three questions from the survey: the first
measured the party identification of each voter, the second measured the perceived
party identification of the candidates, and the third, a count of the campaign contacts
the voters received during the campaign (Appendix 3).
Perceived candidate party identification, which will be referred to as candidate
party identification, was measured on a seven-point scale (Campbell et aI., 1960). The
lower a voter ranked the candidate on the scale, the stronger their perception that
candidate is a democrat. The "other" and "don't know" categories were also included
in the question. We dropped these responses from our data and only considered options one through seven. We subtracted the party identification of Clark from Curtis to use as the dependent variable in our regression model. This produced a scale
ranging from negative six to positive six. This scale was treated as semi-continuous
and was analyzed in an ordinary; least-squares regression measuring the effect of
12
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campaign in determining the difference in candidate party identification. A negative
coefficient indicates voters saw Curtis as being more republican than Clark, and a
positive coefficient indicates voters saw Clark as more republican. A response of zero
meant voters saw no difference between the candidate's party identification (Appendix 2, Figure 1).
Campaign effects were measured via a question asking voters the ways they
were contacted by each campaign. The question included nine ways the voters could
have been contacted, including personal contact from the candidate or campaign,
mailers, blogs, etc. (Appendix 3, Figure 3). The results of this question can be seen
in Table 4 (Appendix 1). We used this data in several ways. First, we included in the
model if they had received a letter from Clark or a letter from Curtis. We analyzed
this separately from the others, because it was the only campaign effect used to shape
candidate party identification. We did this to see if the letters would have a significant
impact on candidate party identification. After totaling the contacts, we calculated
the difference between Clark's total campaign contacts and Curtis' total campaign
contacts (Appendix 2, Graph 2) to examine the distribution of campaign contacts for
Clark and Curtis. This distribution, as demonstrated by the negative values on the
x-axis, shows Curtis' campaign contacted more individuals than Clark's. Lastly, we
included a model controlling whether a voter had received mail from both candidates
(Appendix 1, Table 3). This table shows the majority of individuals who reported being contacted by a campaign received letters from both Curtis and Clark. This was
calculated to see if the impact of letters on painting the partisanship of a candidate
was statistically significant beyond the impact of receiving a letter on its own. If our
thesis is correct, then campaign effects would be significant in determining how voters perceived candidate party identification. A null finding would be because voters
saw no difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis and, thus, the election was in reality nonpartisan.

Results
John Curtis ultimately won the election but not without Steve Clark attempting to make the election about party affiliation. As was predicted, Clark's campaign
sent out mail explaining to voters that Curtis had previously run for State Senate as
a democrat and later was both the president and vice-president of the Utah County
Democratic Party (Appendix 4, Figure 1). Curtis then countered with his own mailer
explaining why he had previously run as a democrat and why it was not important
for the Provo mayoral election (Appendix 4, Figure 2).
Candidate party identification was measured by calculating the mean party
identification score for each candidate. These results may be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). This table shows Clark had a higher mean score than Curtis. Essentially
voters saw Clark as being more republican. While Clark was not able to persuade
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SIGMA

voters that Curtis was a democrat, voters did see him as being less-republican than
Clark, which suggests that Clark's mailers did have an effect on the voters' view of
Curtis' party identification. A comparison of means test was conducted to see if this
difference in candidate party identification was significant. These results can be seen
in Table 2 (Appendix 1). The test statistic was -10.41, which means the difference in
party identification was significant at the 95 percent level.
Table 3 (Appendix A) shows the percentages of voters who were contacted by
only Curtis, only Clark, both of them, or neither of them. This table .shows both candidates contacted 53.8 percent of the voters combined. Overall though, Curtis contacted
more voters than Clark. While Clark's campaign was successful at painting Curtis to
be less republican, it is plausible that Curtis won because he simply reached a higher
number of voters than Clark.
The responses for campaign contacts were calculated and are seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). This table contains the percentage of respondents who were contacted in
each of the nine categories. These percentages were calculated out of the 929 voters
who responded to the question. This table shows Curtis contacted a higher percentage of the voters than Clark in every category except for blogs. This is supported by
the campaign expenditures of the candidates where Curtis spent about $90,000 and
Clark only spent about $36,000 (Provo City web site). It follows that Curtis would
contact more by spending more.
For those voters who received mail from both Clark and Curtis, Curtis limited
the effectiveness of Clark's efforts to frame the election in partisan terms. Figure 1
(Appendix 2), which is a frequency distribution of candidate party identification,
substantiates this claim. This figure shows a plurality of voters did not see a difference between the party identification of Clark and Curtis. A response of no difference
would be zero on the negative six to positive six party identification scale.
In order to explain which campaign contacts had the biggest effects on voter perceptions, we ran four different models utilizing various measurements of campaign
effects on the dependent variable, difference in party identification. The results of
these four models may be seen in Table 5 (AppendiX 1).
The first model included whether or not the voter received a letter from Clark
explaining Curtis' ties with democrats and whether or not they received a letter from
Curtis countering Clark's claims. We recognize that we do not know which specific
mailer(s) the individual voters received from either candidate, but we assume the
voters who received mail most likely received multiple mailers, at least one of which
framed Curtis as a democrat. This model reveals that those who received a letter from
Curtis thought Curtis was more republican. Conversely, those who received a letter
from Clark thought Clark was more republican. This is evidenced by the negative
coefficient for a letter from Curtis and a positive coefficient for a letter from Clark.
Additionally, both of these variables are significant at the 99 percent level. This pro14
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vides evidence that Clark's campaign was successful at making Curtis appear less of
a republican and that Curtis' campaign was successful at countering Clark's claims.
It is important to note that the coefficient for the letter from Clark is larger than the
coefficient for the letter from Curtis, because it suggests Clark's letter had a more
substantive difference in affecting voters' perceptions of his party identification than
Curtis' letter.
The second model consists of all nine campaign contact categories for each candidate, where the first model only looked at the letters sent by the candidates. The
coefficients are still significant and still in the same direction, but they are smaller in
magnitude than the coefficients in Modell. When all campaign contacts are included
in the model, the impact of each campaign on party identification decreases but is still
significant. This could be because the content of the other campaign contacts did not
concern party identification but could have been about other issues.
The third model contains the difference between the total campaign contacts of
Clark and the total campaign contacts of Curtis. This variable's coefficient was significant and positive. This suggests that in total, Clark's campaign was better at influencing candidate party identification than that of Curtis, despite Curtis contacting a
significantly larger percentage of voters.
The fourth model is the most complete, because it controls for the voters who
received mail from both candidates (which was the largest percentage of voters). This
makes it easy to analyze which campaign had greater impact on shaping voters perception of the candidates' party identification. Including whether or not voters received mail from both candidates resulted in Curtis' coefficient becoming larger than
Clark's. This is noteworthy, because in the first model excluding the "both mail" variable, the coefficient for the letter from Clark was larger than the letter for Curtis. This
means ultimately the Curtis campaign successfully counteracted Clark's effort to tum
the election partisan. Both letter coefficients for Clark and Curtis were still significant.
Also, the "both mail" variable was not significant. This indicates voters who received
letters from both candidates did not see a difference in their party identification. This
explains why Curtis won in such a conservative city despite Clark's efforts to paint
him as a democrat, The r-squared values for the first three models were very low, the
highest being 0.10. The r-squared value for the fourth model was 0.57. This large increase provides evidence that the fourth model is the best at explaining the difference
in party identification between Clark and Curtis.

Limitations
The nature of nonpartisan elections limits how much we can generalize. A major
theme of this paper is that candidate campaigns can have a huge impact on the level
of partisanship in these types of elections. Additionally, a candidate's personal and
political history can have a huge impact on nonpartisan elections. Also, the presence
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of divisive issues where differences in political ideology are noticeable could affect
whether or not nonpartisan elections really are nonpartisan. While we are confident
about the Provo City mayoral election, it would be impossible to use these results to
predict other nonpartisan elections, because there is too much variation in unobservable characteristics between cities.
Our study of the Provo City election gave us the ability to see the power of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections given the homogenous demographics of both
the candidates and the electorate. While the homogeneity worked to our advantage
in this case study, it also makes it difficult to apply our findings to ~ther, more heterogeneous cities. Individual voters will react differently to campaign effects. For example, republicans and democrats might react differently to campaign effects, the effect
of which was immeasurable in Provo due to the small presence of democrats. Gender,
race, socioeconomic status, and education might also affect the voters' vulnerability
to campaign effects. Further research on campaign effects in nonpartisan elections
should be done in varying locations to take into account these considerations.

Conclusion
Both Clark and Curtis ran successful campaigns. Both influenced voters' decisions on Election Day through campaign effects. Clark was successful at framing Curtis as a democrat, but Curtis was more successful at counteracting Clark's attacks,
and, thus, won the election. Curtis not only successfully counteracted his opponent's
attacks, he clearly won the campaign contact battle, which likely contributed to his
election victory.
The study of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be an area of
continued research. Our research has focused specifically on the effect campaigns
have on shaping the voters' view of party identification in a nonpartisan race. Nonpartisan elections were originally established to remove party identification from
the candidates in order to focus the election on "who the best man for the job is"
(Schaffner et. al 2001). As long as voters refuse to research each candidate and the
issues, they will be easily swayed by low-cost cues typically sourcing from campaign efforts. Further research of the role party identification of candidates plays in
nonpartisan elections would provide evidence for the continued use of nonpartisan
elections or to their demise.
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Appendixl
Table 1
Voter Party ID
Strong Democrat

Percent
4.93

2

1.21

3

7.83

Independent

14.10

5

24.36

6

13.02

Strong Republican

34.55

Table 2: Candidate Party ID Summary question.

* Answers of 0 (no response), 8, 9 (prefer not to say, don't know) were

all dropped from the Party ID

Table 3: Who contacted Whom
Clark
Curtis

No Contact

Contact

Total

No Contact

2

6.

32

Contact

14.2

5

68

Total

39.4

60.6

100
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Table 4: Campaign Contacts
CampO:llgn AlIccls

Clark

CurtIs

Personal Contact

21.42

25.51

Contact by a Campaigner

23.57

30.89

Flyer at House

60.50

72.55

Mail

60.60

68.03

Church Friends/ Activities

23.25

24.54

Email

9.47

11.30

Blogs

10.33

8.40

Neighbor Contact

24.33

25.94

News/Magazine

24.87

27.34

These values are given as percentages.

Table 5: OLS Models
Depcndl'nt Vanablc: Dltfcrcncc
Regressor

111

Party ID (6 to-6

1

2

3

-l

Curtis Letter

-0.72**
(0.21)

-0.93**
(0.27)

Clark Letter

1.12**
(0.19)

0.72*
(0.37)

Curtis Campaign Contacts

-0.18**
(0.04)

Clark Campaign Contacts

0.32**
(0.04)

Difference in Candidate Campaign Contacts

0.26**
(0.03)

Mail from Both Candidates

0.56
(0.43)

Intercept
RA2

0.63**
(0.16)

0.52**
(0.15)

0.92**
(0.08)

0.72**
0.17

0.05

0.10

0.09

0.57

Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients, Individual coefficients are
statistically Significant at the *5% level or **1% level.
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Appendix 2
Graph 1
Difference in Candidate Party 10

Graph 2
Difference in Campaign
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Appendix 3
Figure 1: Voter Party Identification

[Q] Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n)
10 Strong Democrat
2(J Not so strong Democrat
3(J Independent leaning Democrat

40 Independent
5(J Independent leaning Republican
c(J Not so strong Republican

70 Strong Republican
8(J Other
Q(J Don't know

Figure 2: Candidate Party Identification

[0] On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1ls a strong Democrat and 715
a strong Republican, where would you place each of the
following people? Circle one number for each line.
Strong
strong
Republican
DelTlOCf8t
Independent
T
T
T

a. Governor H8fbert

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

b. Senator Bennett

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

c. John Curtis
d. Steve Cieri<

1

3

4

5

7

1

3

4

5

6
6

7

Figure 3: Campaign Effects
l.J J Candidates contact voters In many ways. Please mark the
ways In which you have had contact with Steve Clark and
.John Curtis or their campaigns.
Steve
John
C lark
Curtis

'0

a. Personal Contact

to
to

'0
'0
'0
'0

e. Church Friends/Activities

to

h. NeIghbor Contact
I.N

'0

20

20
"0
20
20
20
"0
"0
20
20
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Appendix 4
1: Oark letter / Front Side
IF CONSISTENCY IS IMPORTANT TO ~.
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